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When Open Courts Meet  
Closed Government 
David M. Paciocco* 
I have long been aware at an intellectual level of the importance of 
the “open court” principle. I did not fully appreciate that importance, 
though, until I witnessed the President of the Appeals Chamber of the 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda order that a hearing I was 
counsel at would go into “closed session.”1 I was about to cross-
examine an expert witness who had testified for the Prosecution at the 
trial about a missive he had sent to the Prosecutor after the trial was over 
claiming that our client was not at the location of a massacre for which 
he was convicted. When the President made his order the microphones 
in the sound-proof, glass-walled visitor’s gallery were turned off. Then 
automatic blinds were inched closed to the sound of a grating motor, 
blocking the view into the courtroom from the gallery, presumably so 
that no one could read the expert’s lips while looking at the back of his 
head (which is all their vantage point allowed). What then transpired 
was to be “closed” from the world forever.  
What amazed me about this development was that the Prosecutor 
had not even asked for the hearing to move into closed session. The 
witness requested it. All he had to say in order for the President to shut 
the public out and forever seal what was about to transpire was that he 
was concerned for the safety of some of the witnesses he had spoken to, 
should their names become public. No evidential foundation for his fear 
was presented or asked for, and no canvass was undertaken for less 
intrusive ways to protect those witnesses, if they indeed needed protec-
tion.
2
 The President did not even invite submissions before making the 
                                                                                                                                
*
  Common Law Section, University of Ottawa; Of Counsel ― Edelson and Associates. 
1
  The case is Prosecutor v. Georges Rutaganda. The final appeal decision (The Prosecu-
tor v. Georges Rutaganda, Case No. ICTR-96-3-A, 26 May 2003), and the decision on this fresh 
evidence motion (Decision on Consolidated Defence Motion, 3 January 2003) can be found online 
at <www.ictr.org> (last accessed 27 June 2005).  
2
  Such as leaving the hearing open but assigning the witnesses pseudonyms, or having the 
expert write out their names and hand them up to the Tribunal when their identifications were being 
canvassed. 
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order. We simply continued in a closed proceeding in which issues 
central to the liberty of my client would be determined away from the 
eyes of the world.  
The irony that a Tribunal, created to enable the eyes of the world to 
witness justice, would so reflexively go into “closed session” was not 
lost on me. Nor did I fail to see the long-term risks of such practices to 
the integrity of the justice the Tribunal was dispensing. As a Canadian 
lawyer I dismissed this attitude about the open court principle as yet one 
more product of the cultural gap between Canadian conceptions of jus-
tice and those that apply internationally. Canadian justice system partic-
ipants
3
 would never be so cavalier about the open court principle, I 
thought. I am beginning to fear that maybe I was wrong.  
I. INTRODUCTION 
The law, of course, largely controls the degree to which the open 
court principle is respected. “Legal culture,”4 however, has as much to 
do with the fortunes of the “open court principle” as does the law. The 
law often provides only standards — not clear answers. The extent to 
which the open court principle is respected therefore comes down to 
attitude or the commitment to it among justice system participants. The 
point is worth making, indeed stressing, now that our legal culture is 
experiencing the stress of national insecurity brought on by the terrorist 
attacks of 2001.  
We are fortunate that this is a country with a long and demonstrated 
commitment to the open court principle.
5
 But attitudes have changed 
since that commitment rooted. With the notable exception of a decade of 
war in the first half of the 20th century and the October crises of 1970, our 
fidelity to the open court principle was nurtured in a stable democracy, in 
                                                                                                                                
3
  The term “justice system participants” is a term of art in the Criminal Code of Canada, 
R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, defined in s. 2, and includes Parliamentarians, members of the executive, 
prosecutors, lawyers and peace officers. 
4
  I cannot rely as heavily as I do on the term, “legal culture,” without explaining what I 
mean by it. I use the term to define a community’s attitudes about the imposition and application of 
law, both as reflected in the legal system’s own rules, principles and policies, and by the views and 
priorities of those who administer the law.  
5
  See P.B. Shabas, “Media Freedom under the Charter,”  Law Society of Canada Special 
Lectures 2001, Constitutional and Administrative Law (Toronto: Law Society of Upper Canada, 
2002), at 441 for a description of the common law tradition of respect for the principle, and its 
transition to a constitutionally protected ideal. 
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peaceful times. The terrorist attacks of 2001 have ushered in a height-
ened sense of purpose and secrecy on the part of government, and the 
intelligence and law enforcement communities, all in the interests of 
that profoundly powerful goal of “national security.” National security 
can indeed be compromised by the flow of information, and no respon-
sible Canadian would expect legal doctrine to require the disclosure of 
information that would endanger Canada or impair the ability of the 
government to protect its citizens. National security is being invoked, 
however, with increasing frequency. It is being used to shut down public 
access to information that is being relied upon to make serious decisions 
about the liberty of individuals — about whether to execute warrants, 
including warrants against journalists;
6
 about whether “public inquiries” 
into important issues relating to the activities of our national security 
apparatus should really be public inquiries;
7
 about whether to detain 
people in immigration lock-ups and deport them;
8
 about whether to list 
people or groups as terrorist entities;
9
 about whether to seal search war-
rants;
10
 about whether to resist disclosure; about whether to permit de-
fendants to use evidence they have acquired;
11
 and about charging 
individuals with terrorist offences.  
The attitude that gives priority to national security concerns chal-
lenges the open court principle in criminal cases. While it is to be ex-
pected, it is worrisome because it is precisely in times of national 
insecurity that the open court principle takes on special urgency. After all, 
one of the roles of the open court principle is to ensure that individuals 
brought before the courts for prosecution are being treated fairly; the 
                                                                                                                                
6
  The R.C.M.P. executed warrants in January of 2004 at the offices of the Ottawa Citizen 
Group Inc., and at the residence of journalist Juliett O’Neill. The warrant documents were sealed, in 
the interests of national security, leading to protracted litigation to unseal them. See Canada 
(Attorney General) v. O’Neill, [2004] O.J. No. 4649, 192 C.C.C. (3d) 255 (S.C.J.). 
7
  Commission of Inquiry Into the Actions of Canadian Officials in Relation to Maher 
Arar, The Hon. Dennis R. O’Connor, Commissioner [hereinafter “Arar Inquiry”]. 
8
  See, e.g., proceedings against Mohammed Harkat, chronicled in “Mohamed Harket ― A 
Security Certificate Case, 25 For the Defence: Criminal Lawyer’s Association Newsletter, No. 6, 
44. 
9
  Liban Hussein, an Ottawa member of the Somali community, was placed on a terrorist 
list established under the authority of the United Nations Act, but was subsequently de-listed.  
10
  A considerable but unknown number of search warrants have been executed and sealed, 
including one against Ottawa resident, Abdullah Amalki, “Judge Won’t Reverse Ruling on Unseal-
ing Amalki Files,” The Ottawa Citizen (11 January 2005) A14. 
11
  See Canada (Attorney General) v. Ribic, [2003] F.C.J. No. 1964, 185 C.C.C. (3d) 129 
(C.A.), leave to appeal refused (22 October 2003) (S.C.C.). 
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American experience with its overlay of abuse sheltering in a regimen 
of military trials and secret processes shows the heightened need for 
transparency if individual rights are to be respected when a government 
feels most threatened. The situation is decidedly less intense in Canada, 
but the point is made; “History teaches that grave threats to liberty often 
come in times of urgency, when constitutional rights seem too extrava-
gant to endure.”12 
The other role of the open court principle is to secure democracy, 
yet, as has also been observed, “the powers necessary to defeat terrorism 
and suppress insurrection [including state control on the flow of infor-
mation] are the very ones needed to enforce a tyranny.”13 I do not want 
to be histrionic about this. Canada is one of the world’s most stable 
liberal democracies. Our democracy and commitment to individual 
rights and civil treatment runs deep and will survive the current impulse 
to put security concerns first. Still, there are various grades of democra-
cy and various degrees of freedom, and unless those responsible for the 
administration of the open court principle — the executive, government 
officials, line peace officers and, of course, courts — turn their minds to 
the issue and reaffirm their commitment to leave our courts as open as 
they can be in this age of insecurity, our freedom and democracy will be 
diminished more than it need be. Society will suffer for it, and so too 
will some individuals.  
II. THE MEANING OF THE “OPEN COURT PRINCIPLE” 
1. The Open Court Principle is about Access to Information, not 
Access to Wood-paneled Rooms 
The term “open court principle” is potentially misleading. It sounds 
like it is concerned with open doors, including the common law implica-
tion that open doors are an invitation to enter. These rudimentary notions, 
                                                                                                                                
12
  Per Thurgood Marshall, as quoted in Michael Linfield, Freedom under Fire: U.S. Civil 
Liberties in Times of War (Boston: South End Press, 1990) at 1, and see Michael Freeman, Free-
dom or Security: The Consequences for Democracies Using Emergency Powers to Fight Terror 
(Westport, Connecticut: Praeger, 2003), at 2. 
13
  R. Evelegh, Peace-Keeping in a Democractic Society: The Lessons of Northern Ireland 
(Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1978), at 60, quoted at M. Freeman, Freedom or 
Security: The Consequences for Democracies Using Emergency Powers to Fight Terror (Westport, 
Connecticut: Praeger, 2003), at 4. 
(2005), 29 S.C.L.R. (2d) When Open Courts Meet Closed Government 389 
 
open doors and the right of public entry, are indeed encompassed by the 
open court principle but they are not its heart and soul. They are a 
means to an end. The “open court principle” is in fact about access to, 
and the dissemination of, information about what courts do. 
2. Open Doors 
As indicated, the “open court principle” does indeed open court-
room doors. In Vickery v. Supreme Court Nova Scotia (Prothonotary) 
Cory J. described the “first facet” of the open court principle as includ-
ing “the right of the public and of the media, as agents of the public to 
attend trials and court proceedings.”14 That is why the order made by a 
judge under section 486 (1) of the Criminal Code of Canada to exclude 
the public from a sentencing hearing in order to shield a sexual offence 
complainant from being embarrassed by the recitation in front of 
strangers of the horrid things that had happened to her was quashed by 
the Supreme Court of Canada in Canadian Broadcasting Corp. v. New 
Brunswick (Attorney General).
15
 This is also why, in Vancouver Sun 
(Re),
16
 the Supreme Court of Canada arrived at the stunning conclusion 
that investigative hearings being conducted under the Anti-terrorism Act 
should be open, even though judges are not adjudicating contested legal 
claims at those hearings.  
While the open court principle grants public entrance to courtrooms, 
it would be a mistake to think of it as some kind of legal door stop. 
Opening doors is merely a means to an end, and not an end in itself. 
3. Open Court Records  
What the open court principle is really about is access to infor-
mation. It advances the notion that any non-privileged information that a 
court receives in going about its business should be available to the 
public. In Sierra Club of Canada v. Canada (Minister of Finance) 
Iacobucci J. referred to the underlying principle of “public openness, 
both in the proceedings in dispute, and in the material that is relevant to 
                                                                                                                                
14
  [1991] S.C.J. No. 23, [1991] 1 S.C.R. 671, at 688, 64 C.C.C. (3d) 65, at 70, dissenting in 
the result. 
15
  [1996] S.C.J. No. 38, [1996] 3 S.C.R. 480, 110 C.C.C. (3d) 193. 
16
  [2004] S.C.J. No. 41, [2004] S.C.R. 332. 
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its resolution.” 17 That is why in the pre-Charter decision of Nova Scotia 
(Attorney General) v. MacIntyre
18
 the Supreme Court of Canada used 
the open court principle to entitle an investigative reporter to view the 
documents that had been used to secure a search warrant. Search war-
rant hearings, if they can be called hearings at all,
19
 are not open, but 
once the warrant is executed, the information presented to the justice or 
judge is caught by the principle and is generally available to the public 
for inspection and dissemination. The principle, which applies at all 
stages of a legal process including appeals,
20
 has also been called into 
aid to set aside judicial orders sealing court documents.
21
 Any rule or 
ruling that seals information presented to a court or otherwise keeps that 
information from the public is contrary to the open court principle.
22
 
4. Publication 
The open court principle also includes the idea that the information 
that is accessed can be disseminated or published. In Vickery v. Nova 
Scotia Supreme Court (Prothonotary) Cory J. included, in his descrip-
tion of the essential facets of the principle, the right of the media to 
report what transpires in court proceedings.
23
 In Sierra Club of Canada 
v. Canada (Minister of Finance) Iacobucci J. said in the context of the 
principle that the importance of media access to the courts cannot be 
                                                                                                                                
17
  [2002] S.C.J. No. 42, [2002] 2 S.C.R. 522, at 526, 211 D.L.R. (4th) 193, at 197 (empha-
sis added). 
18
  [1982] 1 S.C.R. 175. 
19
  An informant swears an affidavit, meets alone with a justice of the peace or a judge and 
the justice of the peace or judge signs the order. There is hardly any more “hearing” happening than 
there is where a civil judge signs consent orders on written motions in the sanctity of chambers. 
20
  Vickery v. Nova Scotia Supreme Court (Prothonotary), supra, note 14. 
21
 See R. v. Toronto Star Newspapers Ltd., [2005] S.C.J. No. 41; R. v. Eurocopter Canada 
Ltd., [2003] O.J. No. 4238 (C.J.); Canada (Attorney General) v. O’Neill, supra, note 6; R. v. Angel 
Acres Recreation and Festival Property Ltd., [2004] B.C.J. No. 1523 (Prov. Ct.), upheld on judicial 
review [2004] B.C.J. No. 1428; Canada (Commissioner of Competition) v. Cascades Fine Papers 
Group Inc., 2004 FC 95.  
22
  There are related considerations that do not fall directly within the open court principle 
― namely the notions that the subject of a proceeding should have disclosure from the state of 
relevant information in its possession (the right of discovery), and the even more powerful ideal 
that persons affected by information presented during a judicial proceeding should have access to it. 
The open court principle does not address these ideals directly, as it is concerned with public access 
to information. The aforementioned ideals are protected by other principles, like the fair hearing 
principle in administrative law and the powerful right of full answer and defence in criminal cases.  
23
  Supra, note 14, at 688, dissenting in the result.  
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understated, “as [along with public access it] is the method by which the 
judicial process is scrutinized and criticized … and justice … is seen to 
be done.” 24 “It is only through the press that most individuals can really 
learn of what is transpiring in the courts.” 25 The open court principle, 
like the constitutional right of freedom of expression, therefore protects 
both listeners and readers.
26
 
It is therefore helpful to think of the open court principle, not as a 
doctrine that permits access to courtrooms — that is a mere means to an 
end. It exists to protect public access to information. I wish it was called 
the “open information” principle.  
III. WHY THE OPEN COURT PRINCIPLE IS SO IMPORTANT:  
THE PURPOSES IT SERVES  
There are two primary reasons why the open court principle devel-
oped. It exists mainly to (1) protect the interests of those who are subject 
to the authority of courts, and (2) to permit democracy to work. Like so 
many other sacred ideas in our legal system, it is built to some degree on 
mistrust. It is about checks and balance on power — the power of courts 
and the power of the state.  
1. Protecting the Interests of Those Subject to the Authority of 
Courts 
The role of the open court principle in protecting the interests of 
those who are subject to the authority of courts is captured in the time-
less prose of Bentham, “Where there is no publicity, there is no jus-
tice,”27 and, “publicity is the very soul of justice. It is the keenest spur to 
exertion, and the surest of all guards against improbity.” 28 In essence, 
publicity “guarantees the integrity of judicial processes by demonstrat-
ing ‘that justice is administered in a non-arbitrary manner, according to 
                                                                                                                                
24
  Supra, note 17, at para. 52. 
25
  Canadian Broadcasting Corp. v. New Brunswick (Attorney General), supra, note 15, at 
para. 23. 
26
  Ruby v. Canada (Solicitor General), [2002] S.C.J. No. 73, [2002] 4 S.C.R. 3, at para. 
52. 
27
  As quoted in Nova Scotia (Attorney General) v. MacIntyre, supra, note 18, at 183. 
28
  Id., at para. 24, citing J.H. Burton, ed., Benthemania or Selected Extracts from the 
Works of Jeremy Bentham (1843), at 115. 
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the rule of law’.” 29 It also increases the prospect that truthful verdicts 
will be rendered, as the world, including those with knowledge, watch 
as facts unfold.
30
 The principle is therefore meant to ensure that judges 
do not use their power inappropriately or oppressively. It is part of a 
shared legacy with England, the font of the common law, which in-
cludes the Courts of Star Chamber and High Commission where sub-
jects, suspected of being enemies of the state, were spirited away and 
“tried” in closed session.31 The open court principle is dedicated to pre-
venting such abuses. It exists out of recognition that the power of judges 
derives from the law; they are beholden to it and must show that they 
honour it, and this requires that what they do must be seen, and why 
they do it, understood.
32
 The Supreme Court of Canada made these 
observations in Vancouver Sun (Re): 
Openness is necessary to maintain the independence and impartiality 
of courts. It is integral to public confidence in the justice system and 
the public’s understanding of the administration of justice. Moreover, 
openness is a principal component of the legitimacy of the judicial 
process and why the parties and the public at large abide by the 
decisions of courts.
33
 
This face of the open court principle is therefore linked closely to fair 
hearing and fair trial rights, and where a subject is charged with an of-
fence, it is protected, in part, by section 11(d) of the Charter.  
                                                                                                                                
29
  Vancouver Sun (Re), supra, note 16, at para. 25, quoting in part Canadian Broadcasting 
Corp. v. New Brunswick (Attorney General), supra, note 15, at para. 22. 
30
  In Sierra Club of Canada v. Canada (Minister of Finance), supra, note 17, at 217, the 
Court speaks of the important role that the principle has in “seeking the truth and the common 
good.” In Dagenais v. Canadian Broadcasting Corp., [1994] S.C.J. No. 104, [1994] 3 S.C.R. 835, 
at 883 Lamer C.J. noted how publicity maximizes the chance that individuals with relevant infor-
mation will come forward, and helps to prevent perjury by placing witnesses under public scrutiny. 
31
  See The Hon. Roger Salhany, The Origin of Rights (1986), at 90-96. 
32
  Related notions include the time-honoured maxim that “Justice must not only be done, it 
must manifestly be seen to be done,” and the Supreme Court of Canada’s recent, crucial innovation 
in criminal cases in R. v. Sheppard, [2002] S.C.J. No. 30, [2002] 1 S.C.R. 869, making it an error of 
law for judges to fail to give reasons for their decisions where the failure to do so prejudices the 
ability of the accused to be sure that the law has been applied properly. 
33
  Supra, note 16, at para. 25. 
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2. Facilitating Democracy 
The second primary function of the open court principle, the protec-
tion of democracy itself, is even more ambitious. “The freedom of indi-
viduals to discuss information about the institutions of government, their 
policies and practices, is crucial to any notion of democratic rule.”34 
Since courts and particularly criminal courts play a central role in a 
democracy, their policies and practices must be open, not just for the 
sake of enabling criticism of courts as institutions, but to ensure that 
state power is not being abused. As La Forest J. explained in Canadian 
Broadcasting Corp. v. New Brunswick (Attorney General): 
It is in this forum [namely, courts] that the rights of the powerful state 
are tested against those of the individual. As noted by Cory J. in 
Edmonton Journal, courts represent the forum for the resolution of 
disputes between the citizens and the state, and so must be open to 
public scrutiny and to public criticism of their operations.
35
 
Of course, neither open doors at hearings nor obliging court clerks to 
produce documents that judges have used when not engaged in formal 
hearings can realistically advance democracy without dissemination of the 
information that is made known. This, of course, is where freedom of the 
press comes in. The press is the agent for the dissemination of information 
that a democracy requires. Again, only a time-worn quote in more classic 
English than writers today can muster will convey the message in suffi-
ciently reverential tones; appropriately the Supreme Court of Canada 
called the words of James Mill into aid when making this point: 
So true, it is, however, that the discontent of the people is the only 
means of removing the defects of vicious governments, that the 
freedom of the press, the main instrument of creating discontent, is, in 
all civilized countries, among all but the advocates of misgovernment, 
regarded as an indispensable security, and the greatest safeguard of the 
interests of mankind.
36
 
                                                                                                                                
34
  Canadian Broadcasting Corp. v. New Brunswick (Attorney General), supra, note 25, at 
para. 18. 
35
  Id., at para. 20. 
36
  “Liberty of the Press,” in Essays on Government, Jurisprudence, Liberty of the Press, 
and Law of Nations (1825) (reprint ed. 1967), at 18, as quoted in Canadian Broadcasting Corp. v. 
New Brunswick (Attorney General), id., at para. 18. 
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3. Added Intensity in Criminal Cases 
The open court principle applies to all court business in all kinds of 
cases. It even applies in a non-constitutionalized form in civil cases,
37
 to 
administrative reviews,
38
 and in a qualified fashion in immigration cases 
as well.
39
 Because of its function of protecting litigants and democracy, 
the intensity of the open court principle increases, however, where the 
stakes for the litigant are particularly high or where the political process 
is engaged in a proceeding.
40
 In a criminal trial the principle is therefore 
at its most compelling. The stakes for the accused, who the state is at-
tempting to stigmatize and deprive of liberty, are invariably high. Crim-
inal prosecutions are also endemically political. Each one engages the 
nature and extent of state power over the individual.  
The open court principle is particularly compelling in this context 
for another reason — the principle is tied intimately to the basic func-
tion of a criminal trial. As Cory J. has explained, “There can be a cathar-
tic effect to a criminal trial … An open trial process demonstrates to all, 
whether the family of the victim, the family of the accused, or the mem-
bers of the community in general, that the entire criminal process has 
been conducted fairly and that those accused of crimes have been dealt 
with justly.” 41 Chief Justice Lamer made the same basic point in 
Dagenais v. Canadian Broadcasting Corp. when he noted that an open 
criminal trial can help reduce crime through the public expression of 
disapproval of crime.
42
 The open court principle is an essential feature 
of a just and effective criminal system. 
                                                                                                                                
37
  In Sierra Club of Canada v. Canada (Minister of Finance), supra, note 17, the Supreme 
Court of Canada recognized the central importance of the open court principle whenever public 
courts are used to litigate civil disputes. The Court used that principle in evaluating whether a 
“confidentiality order” was valid. A confidentiality order is like a publication ban on steroids. It not 
only prohibits the publication of information, but denies access to the documents to everyone but 
the parties and the court. The order does not, however, exclude the public from court. See also 
Edmonton Journal v. Alberta (Attorney General), [1989] S.C.J. No. 124, [1989] 2 S.C.R. 1326. 
38
  Ruby v. Canada (Solicitor General), supra, note 26; Toronto Star Newspapers Ltd. v. 
Kelly, [2000] O.J. No. 1259 (S.C.J.), cited in P.B. Shabas, “Media Freedom under the Charter” Law 
Society of Canada Special Lectures 2001, Constitutional and Administrative Law (Toronto: Law 
Society of Upper Canada, 2002) 441, at 457. 
39
  Majoub v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [2004] F.C.J. No. 1335. 
40
  Sierra Club of Canada v. Canada (Minister of Finance), [2002] S.C.J. No. 42, [2002] 2 
S.C.R. 522, 211 D.L.R. (4th) 193, at 219. 
41
  Vickery v. Nova Scotia Supreme Court (Prothonotary), [1991] S.C.J. No. 23, [1991] 1 
S.C.R. 671, at para. 78, 64 C.C.C. (3d) 65, at 79, dissenting in the result. 
42
  Supra, note 30, at 883. 
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So, at bottom, the open court principle, this “very soul of justice,”43 
is in large measure about prudent suspicion of government and govern-
ment institutions, and about the importance of sending appropriate mes-
sages to the public in the interests of law and the repute of the 
administration of justice. As Lord Atkin observed, it is the right of any 
citizen to know that coercive action by the state is justified in law. He 
cautioned that the phrase, “justified in law” is emptied of its meaning if 
we are required to take executive officials at their word.
44
 The open 
court principle is an integral part of our system of checks and balances 
and it is therefore constitutionally protected not only by the freedom of 
the press and freedom of expression housed in section 2(b) of the Char-
ter but in the constitutional right to a fair and public hearing found in 
section 11(d).  
IV. THE IMPACT OF 9/11: A CHANGE IN LEGAL CULTURE 
It has become trite to observe that the attack on the United States of 
America (and on American allies and even Western values) caused an 
adjustment in the balance between liberty and security. This was to be 
expected. “Extravagant terrorist attacks tend to bring about … the pre-
vailing belief that if only we extend the arsenal of law enforcement 
agencies by putting at their power more sweeping powers … the country 
will be more secure.”45 This phenomenon has been dubbed the “totali-
tarianism of hazard protection.”46 So it was not surprising when the 
Minister of Justice, in announcing new anti-terrorism measures asserted 
that “the balance between individual rights and collective security shift-
ed after the attacks.”47  
                                                                                                                                
43
  Sierra Club of Canada v. Canada (Minister of Finance), supra, note 40, at para. 52. 
44
  D. Dyzenhaus, “The Permanence of the Temporary: Can Emergency Powers be Normal-
ized,”  in The Security of Freedom: Essays on Canada’s Anti-Terrorism Bill, R.J. Daniels,  
P. Macklem and K. Roach, eds. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2001), at 28.  
45
  O. Gross, “Cutting Down Trees: Law-Making Under the Shadow of Great Calamities” 
in The Security of Freedom: Essays on Canada’s Anti-Terrorism Bill R.J. Daniels, P. Macklem and 
K. Roach, eds. (Toronto: Carswell, 2002) 39, at 42. 
46
  U. Beck, Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity (1992), at 80, quoted in D. 
Schneiderman, “Terrorism and the Risk Society” in The Security of Freedom: Essays on Canada’s 
Anti-Terrorism Bill R.J. Daniels, P. Macklem and K. Roach, eds. (Toronto: Carswell, 2002) 63, at 
69. 
47
  The Globe and Mail (6 October 2001) A1 and (22 October 2001) A7. 
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Unfortunately, while crises, real or perceived, are often the inspira-
tion for law reform, crisis is a dangerous milieu in which to attempt to 
redefine basic political priorities in a liberal democracy. Insecurity re-
duces the resistance to the exercise of government power. “[T]he gen-
eral public and the legal profession (and more importantly the judiciary) 
[tend to] give their seal of approval to such police activity and claims of 
authority.”48 In effect, a legislative honeymoon is created. It enables 
governments, who trust themselves and are less apt to worry about 
checks and balances than about security, to say “trust us.”  “Trust us” is 
not fertile soil for the open court principle. As explained, the open court 
principle is not borne of a culture of trust — it is a product of a “culture 
of justification,” 49 one in which the state is required to demonstrate at 
every turn that it is respecting the rule of law and comporting itself in a 
way that is acceptable to the public. This is not to say that a rule of law 
culture is one of deep mistrust; it is simply one that has sage institution-
alized mechanisms to limit power abuses, mechanisms that depend on 
openness, transparency and information. 
Ironically, while national security typically presents itself as the jus-
tification for secrecy, there is an increased need for openness when a 
government is attempting to deal with a security threat. As has been 
observed, “in the war on terrorism, publics will need to be told more, 
rather than less, about the actions and capabilities of Canadian security 
and intelligence institutions.”50 Where the potential targets in the war on 
terrorism are members of an identifiable group, such as Muslims, the 
need for the public to be kept apprised of what is happening takes on 
                                                                                                                                
48
  O. Gross, “Cutting Down Trees: Law-Making Under the Shadow of Great Calamities” 
supra, note 45, at 51. In truth, much of the academy, the criminal defence bar, civil libertarians, 
feminist groups and equality-seeking groups aligned to challenge successfully some of the initia-
tives that had been undertaken. See K. Roach, September 11: Consequences for Canada (2003), c. 
3. There was only so much that could be done, however, given how sweeping the anti-terrorism 
legislation was. Priorities had to be identified. The open court principle therefore commanded little 
attention. 
49
  D. Dyzenhaus, “The Permanence of the Temporary: Can Emergency Powers be Normal-
ized,”  in The Security of Freedom: Essays on Canada’s Anti-Terrorism Bill R.J. Daniels, P. 
Macklem and K. Roach, eds. (Toronto: Carswell, 2002) 21, at 34, quoting Etienne Mureinik, a 
South African lawyer who used the phrase to describe the post-Apartheid era. See “Law as Justifi-
cation: Etienne Mureinik’s Conception of Legal Culture” (1998) 14 South African Journal of 
Human Rights 11. 
50
  W. Wark, “Intelligence Requirements and Anti-Terrorism Legislation” in The Security 
of Freedom: Essays on Canada’s Anti-Terrorism Bill R.J. Daniels, P. Macklem and K. Roach, eds., 
(Toronto: Carswell, 2002) 287, at 292. 
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increased importance. This is not just to salve public or community 
insecurities. It is because responding to security threats increases the 
risk of abuse. It was broadly agreed during the leading international law 
colloquium on access to information that “most serious violations of 
human rights and fundamental freedoms are justified by governments as 
necessary to protect national security.”51 As states claim exceptional 
powers such as the ability to conduct investigative hearings, or to move 
before the Federal Court to suppress evidence in any other proceeding, 
or to “list” and socially and legally blackball individuals and groups as 
terrorist entities, there is an increased need for vigilance. This is particu-
larly so where states choose to use the criminal law to achieve security. 
The power of the state is being used against individuals, and courts are 
called upon to make profoundly political decisions about the reaches of 
government power.  
In a study of abuse of emergency powers Michael Freeman, an 
American “political risk consultant” concluded what the common law 
has long accepted — that among the essential safeguards in protecting 
against abuse of emergency powers by international governments is the 
ability to monitor the use that is being made of those powers, including 
through the use of free press and free speech.
52
 There is no point in 
having free press and free speech if the facts cannot be known. Those 
checks and balances depend on both open government and open courts. 
The paradox is therefore engaged. Insecurity breeds both a need for 
secrecy and a need to know. 
As always where there is a clash of competing interests, there has to 
be a balance. Achieving that balance depends on the prevailing legal 
culture — on the attitudes of those responsible for defining and adminis-
tering the law. It requires a sensible appreciation, but without exaggera-
tion, of the reality that some information cannot be released without 
endangering the public or undermining the ability of the state to protect 
its citizens, but it depends equally on appropriate commitments to dem-
ocratic principles and the need for checks and balances, including the 
“open court principle.”  In his study, Freeman highlighted the importance 
of an appropriate culture on the part of those exercising emergency power 
                                                                                                                                
51
  The Johannesburg Principles on National Security, Freedom of Expression and Access 
to Information, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1996/39 (1996), Preamble. 
52
  M. Freeman, Freedom or Security: The Consequences for Democracies Using Emer-
gency Powers to Fight Terror (Westport, Connecticut: Praeger, 2003), at 9. 
398  Supreme Court Law Review (2005), 29 S.C.L.R. (2d) 
 
as a palliative for abuse. He used Canada and the October Crisis
53
 as one 
of his exemplars, noting that there was no long term abuse of democrat-
ic rights in Canada following the crisis because the commitment to de-
mocracy was strong; “there was neither the desire nor the opportunity 
[because of a free press and an existing system of checks and balances] 
for individuals or [state] organizations to abuse their … powers.”54  
Of these factors (namely an existing system of checks and balances, 
a free press, and democratic ideals or norms) having commitment to 
appropriate norms is the most important variable in avoiding abuse of 
power.
55
 Lawmakers who do not have appropriate legal culture can 
create laws that do not give appropriate regard to principle. Judges and 
justices of the peace who fail to consider the full importance of the open 
court principle can undermine it in constitutional adjudication, and in 
application. Those who work with the laws, such as prosecutors who 
stand in court and evoke national security justifications at the behest of 
government officials or investigators, or who ferry cases to Federal 
Court to suppress information, or police officers who decide to seek 
sealing orders, can all influence the fortunes of the open court principle. 
If they do not have the appropriate culture of respect for the open court 
principle, it will wither. Of course the law allows constitutional chal-
lenges, but who can afford them? The law may allow applications to 
unseal sealing orders, but what private litigant can pay for days in court 
to fight over redactions in search warrant documents? The fate of the 
open court principle will depend, in many cases, not on courts vindicat-
ing the principle, but on the goodwill and understanding of the non-
judicial justice system participants. An example of an attitude of respect 
for the open court principle was the practice of the Solicitor General and 
the Department of Justice of agreeing to open hearings in Privacy Act
56
 
                                                                                                                                
53
  The “October Crisis” refers to the invocation by the Prime Minister of Canada of emer-
gency powers suspending certain civil liberties in the wake of political kidnappings by the FLQ, a 
group dedicated to using violent means to securing independence for the province of Quebec.  
54
  M. Freeman, Freedom or Security: The Consequences for Democracies Using Emer-
gency Powers to Fight Terror (Westport, Connecticut: Praeger, 2003), at 130. 
55
  M. Freeman, id., at 187. 
56
  Ruby v. Canada (Solicitor General), [2002] S.C.J. No. 73, [2002] 4 S.C.R. 3 regarding 
the Privacy Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. P-21. 
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reviews, even in the face of legislation that contemplated that those 
hearings be closed.
57
 
That the attitudes of bureaucrats or line personnel can determine the 
fortunes of the open court principle is a daunting thought. While Free-
man, with good reason applauded the Canadian commitment to demo-
cratic principles, he was contrasting our experiences during the October 
Crisis with those in Uruguay, where emergency powers were employed 
to stage a coup, and in Peru where they enabled political killings and 
torture. Before we rely too eagerly on Canadian democratic traditions to 
replace our system of checks and balances with a culture of trust it bears 
note that “Canada’s political history offers too many examples of abuse 
and prolongation of emergency powers to assume that the government’s 
assurances of high purposes and careful execution merit automatic def-
erence.”58 There have been too many interned, too many detained, and 
enough illegal acts by peace officers in the name of national security to 
enable us to discount the need for the public to be apprised of govern-
ment activity. 
In spite of periodic episodes where civil liberties were abused, I for 
one am confident that the government of Canada has the best of inten-
tions. Still, there is an unsettling indeterminacy about when an actor can 
be satisfied that an appropriate balance has been achieved. There can be 
different sensibilities about national security and rights. One person’s 
terrorist is another’s freedom fighter, one person’s freedom of expres-
sion can be another’s crime against humanity, and “one state’s reasona-
ble limit on rights of expression and association may be another’s 
undermining of the international humanitarian order.”59 Then there are 
questions about judgment, even where intentions are good. As the Fed-
eral Court of Appeal noted in Gougeon v. Gibson, national security 
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  The practice, reported in Ruby v. Canada (Solicitor General), id., at para. 57, related to 
Federal Court hearings where the government of Canada was relying on national security excep-
tions to deny access to information. The statute purported to require the entire hearing be closed, 
but the practice was to agree to opening it, save when the sensitive information was actually being 
revealed, ex parte, to the judge. The Ruby Court “read down” the statute as unconstitutional, 
removing the mandatory closure of the hearings, leaving the judge with the discretion whether to do 
so. 
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  L.E. Weinrib, “Terrorism’s Challenge to the Constitutional Order” in The Security of 
Freedom: Essays on Canada’s Anti-Terrorism Bill, R.J. Daniels, P. Macklem and K. Roach, eds., 
(2002) 93, at 104. 
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  E. Morgan, “A Thousand and one Rights” in The Security of Freedom: Essays on Cana-
da’s Anti-Terrorism Bill, R.J. Daniels, P. Macklem and K. Roach, eds. (2002) 405, at 411. 
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claims “may be feared and evoked somewhat too quickly, albeit in per-
fect good faith,” 60 particularly by those who are on the front line and 
who see their function as protecting national security. As Hamish Stew-
art has pointed out, Nixon’s staff suggested that an attempt to steal in-
formation to discredit Daniel Ellsberg who had leaked the Pentagon 
papers was justifiable in the interests of national security.
61
 Then there is 
the risk that national security can be used opportunistically as a political 
shield. Those who are in self-protection mode may not be ardent fans of 
the open court principle. Then there is the reality that issues that play 
out in courts are adversarial by nature. It is far too easy for secrecy to 
become a litigation tool. There can be little solace taken then when a 
justice system participant says, even in good faith, “trust me. I have 
achieved an appropriate balance.”  
It is in this light, then, that Canadian legal culture and its commit-
ment to the open court principle needs to be understood. Is that com-
mitment deep enough? 
V. A LEGACY OF RESPECT PRIOR TO 9/11 
In keeping with its central role, Canada has a long history of pro-
tecting the open court principle in criminal matters. Like all principles, 
there are, of course, exceptions. There are provisions that close court 
rooms, deny access to information, and impose publication bans for 
reasons unrelated to national security. (They are listed in a Schedule at 
the end of this article). Even though the number of these exceptions 
becomes long in the listing, the exceptions are tightly constrained. Three 
observations apply: 
 
(1) The suppression of information is typically temporary, and under-
taken to enable court processes to operate; 
(2) In those rare cases where the permanent suppression of information 
occurs, this is not done for some broader state interest but to prevent 
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  [1984] F.C.J. No. 13, 10 C.C.C. (3d) 492, at 504 (C.A.), cited in H. Stewart, “Rule of 
Law or Executive Fiat? Bill C-36 and Public Interest Immunity” in The Security of Freedom: 
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id., at 233. 
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unnecessary harm to the personal interests of a particular individual 
affected by the legal process, relating to information that is too un-
important to affect the outcome of a case; and 
(3) In those rare cases where criminal courts rely in coming to their 
decisions on information that has been suppressed permanently, the 
suppressed information will be used to grant the state access to in-
vestigative techniques like search warrants or wiretaps but not in the 
final adjudication of whether the accused is guilty. 
 
An examination of the network of court closing provisions does not 
contradict the existence of a legal culture that embraces the open court 
principle. It reaffirms that culture.  
The most powerful indicia of a culture of respect for the open court 
principle is found in the constitutional jurisprudence. In R. v. Toronto 
Newspapers Ltd., a decision affirmed by the Supreme Court of Canada, 
Doherty J. described the need for “close scrutiny” according to the “rig-
orous standards” of any attempt to restrict the open court principle.62 
Those standards matured in R. v. Mentuck.
 63
 They are animated by two 
governing principles which are to be applied in a flexible and contextual 
way depending on factors such as the nature of the hearing in question 
and the proposed duration of the suppression of the information.
64
 They 
are animated by two governing principles. The first, the “necessity prin-
ciple,” requires that compromises on the open court principle can be 
tolerated only where there is a demonstrated reason
65
 of superordinate
66
 
importance for doing so. The necessity principle includes within it the 
notion of minimal impairment, that the open court principle can be  
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  [2003] O.J. No. 4006, 67 O.R. (3d) 577, at para. 19 (C.A.), affd [2005] S.C.J. No. 41, 
supra, note 21. 
63
  [2001] S.C.J. No. 73, [2001] 3 S.C.R. 442, 158 C.C.C. (3d) 449. Mentuck is a publica-
tion ban case but the Mentuck test applies to all open court principle situations, including, whether 
courts remain open: Vancouver Sun (Re), [2004] S.C.J. No. 41, [2004] 2 S.C.R. 332; controlling 
confidentiality orders: Sierra Club of Canada v. Canada (Minister of Finance), [2002] S.C.J. No. 
42, [2002] 2 S.C.R. 522, 211 D.L.R. (4th) 193; and controlling the issuance of sealing orders 
relating to warrant informations; Toronto Star Newspapers Ltd. v. Ontario, id. 
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  R. v. Toronto Star Newspapers Ltd., [2005] S.C.J. No. 41, at para. 31, supra, note 21. 
65
  Sierra Club of Canada v. Canada (Minister of Finance), id., at 208; R. v. Toronto Star 
Newspapers Ltd., supra, note 21. 
66
  R. v. MacIntyre, [1982] 1 S.C.R. 175, at 186-87. 
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sacrificed no farther than it has to be in order to fulfill the pressing 
need.
67
  
The second governing principle is “proportionality.” The benefits of 
suppressing the open court principle have to outweigh the damage that 
is done to the individuals affected, the legal system, and to Canadian 
society as a whole by inhibiting access to the information.
68
 Those who 
advocate compromises on the open court principle, including Parliament 
when it passes laws limiting the principle,
69
 bear a heavy burden of 
justification. 
VI. THE OPEN COURT PRINCIPLE AFTER 9/11: DIMINISHED RESPECT 
This same degree of commitment to the open court principle has not 
survived 9/11. To be sure, no one could reasonably have expected it 
would. National security concerns are more pressing now, and they will 
require the suppression of some information. The question, however, is 
whether a respectful balance has been attained. The Supreme Court of 
Canada noted in advance of anti-terrorism legislation that “Parliament’s 
challenge is to draft laws that effectively combat terrorism and conform 
to the requirements of our Constitution and our international commit-
ments.”70 While things could have been worse, I do not think that this 
balance has been achieved. Some of the laws that have been adopted 
since September 11, and which limit the open court principle, go farther 
than they need to, leaving too little flexibility. I do not say this solely as 
a matter of personal taste; I have already acknowledged the subjectivity 
of values. I say it in light of the Mentuck principles and the jurispru-
dence of the Supreme Court of Canada.  
It is not just the legislation that is worrisome. Being mindful of the 
dangers of over-generalizing, there is reason to fear that non-judicial 
justice system participants may be focused too intently on national secu-
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  Sierra Club of Canada v. Canada (Minister of Finance), supra, note 63, at para. 46. 
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  R. v. Mentuck, supra, note 63, at para. 32. 
69
  Subsection 487.2(1) of the Criminal Code of Canada purported to prohibit the publica-
tion of information relating to the execution of search warrants, but it has been struck down as 
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  Suresh v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [2002] S.C.J. No. 3, 
[2002] 1 S.C.R. 3, at para 4. 
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rity, to the point where its demands are exaggerated and the open court 
principle is being needlessly compromised. 
1. Statutory Changes: The Legislative Culture Post 9/11 
(a) Subsection 486: Closing Courts 
Subsection 486(1) of the Criminal Code of Canada was amended to 
expand the grounds for excluding the public from court, to include those 
cases where doing so “is necessary to prevent injury to international 
relations or national defence or national security.” This amendment was 
more symbolic than technically significant. Prior to the amendment 
subsection 486(1) already allowed for courts to be closed “in the inter-
ests of public order or for the proper administration of justice,” which 
no doubt would have included national security concerns.
71
 The 
amendment to subsection 486(1) then, did less to change the law, than to 
give comfort to courts by showing that Parliament considers interna-
tional relations, national defence and national security as appropriate 
bases for closing courts. Parliament has provided overtly for the possi-
bility of trials, secret in whole or in part, for the prosecution of terrorism 
offences. 
As daunting as this power may seem to ardent fans of open courts, 
things could have been worse. First, the provision is discretionary. Pros-
ecutors will need to present a compelling case for closing courts. Se-
cond, the provision does not, as in the case of immigration proceedings, 
empower courts to flout full answer and defence considerations by re-
ceiving and relying on information that is kept from the accused.
72
 Par-
liament cannot be faulted for the existence and design of this particular 
provision. 
                                                                                                                                
71
  By way of analogy, sealing orders can be granted under s. 487.3(1) under the rubric of 
“the ends of justice” for national security purposes, without any express recitation of this authority: 
Canada (Attorney General) v. O’Neill, [2004] O.J. No. 4649, 192 C.C.C. (3d) 255 (S.C.J.). 
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  To a degree, the reality that the accused and its counsel will learn of the information 
may undermine the intensity of the case for closing the court. 
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(b) The Infamous Section 38 
The open court principle is concerned, of course, with matters of se-
crecy. The Anti-terrorism Act provision relating to secrecy that has 
attracted the greatest attention has been the amendment to subsection 38 
of the Canada Evidence Act. This provision has been criticized, and 
with good reason.
73
 Subsection 38 does not, however, lead to rulings 
that contravene the open court principle directly, as it does not purport 
to deny public access to information that has been presented during the 
prosecution of the accused. In other words, it is not a provision allowing 
prosecutors to advance their case against the accused by presenting 
information ex parte or even in closed courts.
74
 Instead, it deals with 
whether information should be disclosed — in particular, information 
that would be injurious to international relations, national defence, or 
national security. In substance, it creates a privilege. It prohibits presen-
tation of such information to a court,
75
 or the disclosure of such infor-
mation by a court, unless the Federal Court has decided that the public 
interest in disclosure outweighs the public interest in non-disclosure.
76
  
The section 38 regime does, however, compromise the open court 
principle indirectly in two important respects. First, any section 38 hear-
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  See, e.g., H. Stewart, “Rule of Law or Executive Fiat? Bill C-36 and Public Interest 
Immunity,”  supra, note 60, at 217. 
74
  Information is presented ex parte where this is done without notice to or argument by an 
adverse party: Ruby v. Canada (Solicitor General), supra, note 56, at para 23. In Canada (Attorney 
General) v. O’Neill, supra, note 70, the presiding judge did, however, use s. 38 to sustain objec-
tions to the disclosure of particular information that was relied upon by a Justice of the Peace in a 
sealed search warrant application. In this sense, s. 38 was used to permit the Crown to rely on 
information to obtain a judicial order, without disclosing that information to the defence.  
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  See Canada (Attorney General) v. Ribic, [2003] F.C.J. No. 1964, 185 C.C.C. (3d) 129 
(C.A.); leave to appeal refused 22 October 2003. 
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  The Attorney General of Canada can override a decision by a court to receive or dis-
close the information by filing a “certificate” under s. 38.13. The relevant provisions are all prohibi-
tions on disclosure. It would be a mistake to interpret s. 38 as authorizing a court to receive as 
evidence, and then not disclose to the public or a party, any information or evidence. The first step 
in the regime is to stop information from being disclosed before the government has a chance to 
object. Subsections 38.01(1)-(4) impose obligations on the various participants in a case to notify 
the Attorney General of Canada before this happens. In particular, s. 38.01(1) speaks of the “possi-
bility of disclosure,” and ss. 38.01(2)-(4) address the prospect that protected information is “about 
to be disclosed.” The operative provision, s. 38.02(1)(a), proscribes disclosure of the information. 
The second step in the regime is to enable the Attorney General to apply to the Federal Court if 
information is about to be disclosed or ordered disclosed. Subsection 38.04 permits applications for 
an order “with respect to the disclosure of [such] information,” and s. 38.06 describes when disclo-
sure can be made. The last stage, s. 38.13 empowers the Attorney General of Canada to issue a 
certificate that “prohibits disclosure.”   
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ing before the Federal Court to determine whether to guard information 
from disclosure, or any appeal from that hearing, is to be conducted in 
camera — in other words, with the public excluded. Second, subsection 
38.02 makes not only the contents of the hearing confidential, but also 
the very fact that a hearing is being held.  
It has been suggested that closing the hearing is “a sensible precau-
tion” since the point of the proceeding is to determine whether the in-
formation in question is to be disclosed.
77
 This opinion was expressed 
prior to the Supreme Court of Canada decision in Ruby v. Canada (So-
licitor General).
78
 There the Supreme Court of Canada held that a provi-
sion requiring an administrative review court to be closed in its entirety 
when considering whether a national security exemption applied was 
not minimally impairing of the open court principle. It held that the 
provision had to be read down so that judges would have the discretion 
of whether to close the proceeding when ex parte material was not being 
presented. If a proceeding is to be closed, the state must demonstrate the 
need on a case-by-case basis. Mandatory closure of courts, and confi-
dentiality orders on all information, are overbroad according to Mentuck 
standards. 
It should only rarely be necessary to close a courtroom entirely in 
order to control litigation relating to whether information should be 
disclosed. Courts are not closed when parties fight over whether infor-
mation, such as a solicitor-client confidence, is privileged. In Canada 
(Attorney General) v. O’Neill, the Court dealt with objections based on 
section 38 considerations in open court, while preserving the confidenti-
ality of the information from both the public and counsel. The Court did 
so by working from a redacted document and enabling objections to be 
made by the Crown to inappropriate questions asked during cross-
examination of an affiant for a sealing order. The same was managed in 
A.G. (Canada) v. Amalki; the challenge to a national security based 
sealing order before a Provincial Court Judge was undertaken in open 
court.
79
  
                                                                                                                                
77
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The second ban, the automatic confidentiality order relating to the 
very fact that a hearing is being held, “goes well beyond what is neces-
sary to protect the information in question.”80 There may be cases where 
there is a public interest in trying to limit knowledge of the existence of 
an investigation in which a section 38 hearing arises, but where this is 
so, Mentuck standards require the government to establish this. This 
absolute confidentiality provision is overbroad and unconstitutional. It 
reveals an inadequate commitment to the open court principle. 
(c) Subsections 83.05(6) and 83.06(1) 
A number of new anti-terrorism offences in the Criminal Code of 
Canada turn on whether an entity (which can include an individual) is a 
“terrorist group.”  Parliament established a procedure in subsections 
83.05 and 83.06 of the Criminal Code for administratively listing enti-
ties, thereby deeming an entity to be a terrorist group. There is a judicial 
review procedure established by the legislation. This process, which can 
have tremendous impact on the outcome of criminal charges,
81
 mimics 
immigration procedures where little regard is given to open court and 
full answer and defence considerations.
82
 During a judicial review pro-
ceeding under subsection 83.05, the Solicitor General can require the 
judge to examine the matter “in private.”83 The judge shall receive at 
that hearing, in private and in the absence of counsel for the listed enti-
ty, any information that has been obtained in confidence from a foreign 
state or international organization, and if the judge finds it relevant, the 
judge can consider it.
84
 With respect to other material, if the judge is of 
                                                                                                                                
was issued was broader than required: 3 June 2005, C42288, addendum released 9 June 2005, 
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  H. Stewart, “Rule of Law or Executive Fiat? Bill C-36 and Public Interest Immunity,”  
supra, note 60, at 224. 
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  For my general criticisms of this regime, see “Constitutional Casualties of September 
11: Limiting the Legacy of the Anti-Terrorism Act” (2002) 16 S.C.L.R. (2d) 185. 
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  See L. Waldman, Canadian Immigration & Refugee Law Practice, 2005 (2005) at 237-
46 for a description of the regime. Immigration cases, including deportation hearings, do not 
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  Criminal Code, s. 83.05(6)(a). 
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  Criminal Code, s. 83.06. 
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the opinion that disclosure would injure national security or endanger 
the safety of a person, the judge may hear all or part of the evidence in 
the absence of counsel.
85
  
The process of using administratively established lists as the basis 
for establishing an essential element in criminal prosecutions in lieu of 
proof beyond a reasonable doubt is deeply disturbing in its own right.
86
 
So, too, is the use by a court of evidence that has been received ex parte 
and which the opposing party will thereby be unable to answer. Given 
the focus of this paper I will leave these considerations aside. The cur-
rent point is that aspects of the regime denigrate the open-court principle 
unduly.  
First, subsection 83.05(6)(a) empowers the Solicitor General to ef-
fectively close the court. The judge has no discretion in the matter. This 
provision is contrary to Ruby v. Canada (Solicitor General),
87
 and 
should not be defensible in the face of Charter challenge. 
Second, the right of the Crown under subsection 83.06 to require a 
private hearing where a judge will decide whether to consider infor-
mation obtained in confidence from a foreign state also compromises 
the open court principle, but it is not so easy to challenge as unconstitu-
tional. In Ruby v. Canada (Solicitor General) the Supreme Court of 
Canada accepted the need for a provision that gives the government an 
absolute right to furnish ex parte in a Privacy Act
88
 hearing information 
obtained in confidence from a foreign state, and held that the presenta-
tion of the information would have to be done in private, notwithstand-
ing the judge’s discretion at other points in a hearing to leave the 
hearing open or closed. Ruby, though, was not a criminal case. It was an 
administrative one. While subsection 83.06 appears on its face to be an 
administrative procedure dealing with the compilation of government 
lists, it is situated in the Criminal Code of Canada. More importantly, 
the terrorist list is intended to be used as surrogate proof, in criminal 
proceedings, for the terrorist character of a listed entity. This is a crimi-
nal law initiative, albeit disguised as an administrative one. Given the 
increased importance of the open court principle in the criminal context, 
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requiring but not authorizing a judge to hold a private hearing may con-
travene the Charter. Still, the heart of the Ruby reasoning had to do with 
the need to enable the Canadian government to give absolute assurances 
to foreign governments that shared information would not be disclosed, 
and the Court accepted that without the information being presented in a 
fully secret hearing, assurances may not satisfy foreign states.
89
 
Notwithstanding this, subsection 83.06 appears to go farther than it 
has to. It requires the entire application for admission to be held in pri-
vate. According to Mentuck, the Crown has to provide an evidentiary 
foundation to support its claim that the information was received in 
confidence from a foreign government. In most cases one would expect 
that this could be done without revealing the confidential information.  
(d) Opportunistic Amendments 
Parliament took the opportunity when revising its public interest 
immunity provisions under the Canada Evidence Act to impose in cam-
era hearings on section 37 applications. Section 37 applications do not 
deal invariably with national security-type information, but rather with 
any information the government wishes to keep secret on the basis of 
any “specified public interest.” Under the amendment made in section 
37.21, both these hearings and appeals from them were to be held in 
camera.
90
 The requirement that the courts be closed was again over-
broad; while it may be justifiable in particular cases, there was no rea-
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son for a blanket protection. In April of 2004 this provision was re-
pealed,
91
 no doubt as a result of the realization that it would not have 
passed constitutional muster in light of Ruby v. Canada (Solicitor Gen-
eral).
92
 
The government also took the opportunity presented by 9/11 to 
amend section 486 of the Criminal Code of Canada to increase the 
range of publication bans on the names of victims and witnesses. 
Whereas the protection was once confined to sexual offences, subsec-
tion 486(4.1) now permits judges to order publication bans to secure the 
identity of complainants and witnesses for any offence, in order to pro-
tect them or their privacy.
93
 There is another innovation in the new pro-
vision. The names of “justice system participant[s],” defined broadly 
enough to include members of Parliament, executive members of gov-
ernment, lawyers, judges, jurors, and court and parole officials,
94
 can be 
subject to a publication ban. 
The fact that the government embedded open court compromises 
that will typically have nothing to do with national security matters in a 
statute that deals with anti-terrorism initiatives is dispiriting. The disap-
pointment is mollified to some degree as a result of the repeal of subsec-
tion 37.21, but is not alleviated. The initiative was symptomatic of a 
diminished commitment to the open court principle. It would have been 
better and more in keeping with Canadian traditions of liberal democra-
cy if the government had undertaken its task of creating dangerous and 
exceptional powers with a demonstrated reluctance and a commitment 
to minimizing their intrusion on basic principles. Instead, it used the 
legislative honeymoon that Canadians had granted it to deal with the 
terrorism threat, to water down the open court principle in other con-
texts. 
(e) The Absence of a Definition 
The legislation is not crafted in a fashion that is likely to acculturate 
justice system participants with a cautious attitude about using national 
security to close down access to information. Section 38, perhaps the 
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benchmark for identifying what the standards of protection for infor-
mation are, does not define the term, “national security.”  Nowhere does 
it reflect the international standard that to be protected for national secu-
rity reasons information must have the demonstrable effect, if released, 
of threatening a nation’s existence or territorial integrity or of imperiling 
the nation’s capacity to respond to force or the threat of force.95 Section 
38 leaves the criteria unbridled. Had national security been defined in an 
appropriately cautious fashion, it would have decreased the risk of un-
necessary sacrifice of the open court principle. 
Hence, some of the legislative compromises on the open court prin-
ciple contained in the legislation are defensible and sufficiently flexible 
to enable the principle to be secured on a case-by-case basis. On bal-
ance, though, it appears that Parliament over-reached, under the influ-
ence of post 9/11 angst. Section 38 hearings should not be closed 
automatically and in their entirety, and the fact that such hearings are 
being held should not automatically be confidential. Nor should subsec-
tion 83.05 review hearings be automatically closed. There is also reason 
to believe that the private, ex parte procedures for resolving applications 
to protect foreign intelligence could be more open than they are. Finally, 
the fact that the section 37 amendment and the expansion of publication 
bans in subsection 486(4.1) were housed opportunistically in what the 
public believed to be emergency legislation, is not a positive omen for 
the open court principle, even bearing in mind the ultimate re-opening 
of section 37 hearings in the face of certain constitutional defeat. 
VII. OPEN COURT CULTURE AND JUSTICE SYSTEM PARTICIPANTS 
It is difficult to generalize about whether non-judicial officers who 
administer the law have maintained an appropriate commitment to the 
open court principle. The irony is that this inability to know is largely 
because of secrecy. The public does not know how many closed section 
38 applications have been held, since the disclosure of an application is 
prohibited. Similarly, where court presented information is kept under 
wraps because of national security concerns, there is no way to test 
whether the claim is warranted, short of trusting officers, governments, 
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and in some cases closed courts — courts who may have to decide the 
national security matter without the benefit of arguments or meaningful 
advocacy by opposing counsel who are kept in the dark. It is simply 
impossible to know whether those officials who undertake in the name 
of national security initiatives that close information to the public are 
adequately respecting the open-court principle. Yet, there are reasons to 
be concerned.  
These reasons include the staggering amount of material that the 
government is trying to suppress in the Arar inquiry, to the degree that a 
supposedly public inquiry has been held in private for months while the 
Commissioner forges through it. In a press release, the Commission 
observed that “some of the information blacked out by the government 
could not conceivably relate to National Security Confidentiality.”96 
This includes information over which the government did not claim 
National Security Confidentiality in the hearing before the 
Commissioner on October 29. It also includes some conclusions drawn 
by the Commissioner that do not disclose any substantive information, 
and information that was subject of the public testimony at the 
Commission’s public hearings in July.
97
 
The position taken by CSIS before the Arar Commission about what 
must be secured is simply staggering. Emboldened by the decision in 
Henrie v. Canada (Security Intelligence Review Committee)
98
 and its 
acceptance of the “mosaic effect” in which cunning readers are assumed 
to be able to take apparently innocuous information into the general 
picture to make damaging deductions, it argued that a forward looking 
approach should be taken which accepts that one cannot know what 
risks today’s information might present tomorrow.  
For this reason CSIS routinely refuses to publicly disclose information 
about past or ongoing investigations or information acquired about 
individuals. Indeed, CSIS does not confirm or deny any such matters. 
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The government submitted that even when that information is in the 
public domain, there could be injury if CSIS confirms its accuracy.
99
 
Reasons for concern include the overbroad orders that were sought 
and granted in the O’Neill and Amalki cases,100 where everything used to 
secure search warrants was sealed, much of which proved after expen-
sive unsealing litigation to have had nothing to do with national securi-
ty.  
Reasons for concern include the inconsistency between government 
officials from case to case in terms of what needs to be kept confiden-
tial; in O’Neill the name of the project, “A-OCanada,” was suppressed, 
ostensibly for fear that revealing the moniker could imperil the anti-
terrorism investigation, while at the same time the name was made pub-
lic uneventfully at the Arar Inquiry.  
Reasons to be concerned about a culture of inadequate respect for 
the open-court principle include the exaggerated claims of national 
security made in O’Neill. By way of example, national security was 
used to justify non-disclosure of the address of the office where the 
R.C.M.P. task force was working. On cross-examination it was discov-
ered that the building had an R.C.M.P. sign in front of it. National secu-
rity was also used to suppress the names of co-operating police forces 
from the search warrant information, even though the Ottawa Police 
Force had announced publicly to the Muslim community in advance of 
the Arar Inquiry that it had participated in the investigation, and even 
though the O.P.P. relied on its own participation in the investigation to 
try to get standing before the Arar Inquiry.  
It would be unfair to generalize from these isolated examples and 
say that there is a legal cultural problem among those who administer 
the law, but these anecdotes give reason for concern. These experiences, 
coupled with the natural litigation based incentives to exploit secrecy in 
an adversarial system, the ability to use national security to prevent 
embarrassment, or the distorting impact of national security tunnel vi-
sion should prevent us from assuming goodwill and good judgment 
across the board.  
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These kinds of experiences and realities should also chasten the ap-
parent enthusiasm of some courts to defer in open court matters to gov-
ernment claims of national security, as was done in Canada (Attorney 
General) v. Ribic where a “reasonableness standard” was employed.101 
With respect, upholding national security claims unless no person advis-
ing the Crown could reasonably have believed it to be necessary is not 
in keeping with the presumption of openness in Mentuck, nor does it 
reflect the heavy burden of justification that the law imposes on closed 
court initiatives. Much to be preferred is the approach that O’Connor J. 
is taking in the Arar Inquiry; while it must be accepted that the govern-
ment and its witnesses can have access to special information and exper-
tise, there is a need to be “vigilant about the possibility that the 
government could attempt to use the opportunity to claim [National 
Security] in order to delay or avoid the release of embarrassing infor-
mation, the disclosure of which would not be injurious to any of the 
elements of [National Security].”102 
VIII. OPEN COURT CULTURE AND THE SUPREME  
COURT OF CANADA 
The most optimistic note about Canadian legal culture and the open 
court principle in this national security era is Vancouver Sun (Re),
103
 a 
decision of the Supreme Court of Canada. Vancouver Sun (Re) is a re-
markable case. It involved a challenge to the constitutional validity of 
one of the most startling innovations in The Anti-terrorism Act, the 
investigative hearing provisions.
104
 Those provisions create a procedure 
that enables investigators to compel witnesses to provide information 
during terrorism investigations. Even though this kind of compulsion, 
let alone the use of a court’s power to assist in that compulsion, is a 
radical departure from existing practice and tradition, the challenge 
failed. What is most striking about the decision, though, is the reaffirma-
tion the Court gave to the open court principle. The Court criticized the 
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level of secrecy that had been applied when the procedure was used to 
extract information from an Air India witness, reciting the need to pro-
tect democracy and the repute of the administration of justice by con-
ducting investigative hearings in public. While the Court accepted that 
parts, even large parts, of those hearings may have to be held in camera 
in a given case to protect sensitive information, it affirmed the open-
court principle in powerful terms. The Court made it clear that closing a 
court, even during an investigative hearing, should be “undertaken with 
the greatest reluctance.”105 In doing so it reified the open court principle. 
It reinforced it not with respect to a hearing where a court or tribunal 
would be adjudicating a dispute between parties. It affirmed it in a most 
unexpected context. Investigative procedures are rarely carried out in 
public, and investigators are quick to argue against the release of inves-
tigative material for fear it will scuttle further efforts. So the government 
argued for a presumption that investigative hearings be closed. This 
“close down the show” position by the government speaks poorly of its 
commitment to the open court principle, but the voice of the Supreme 
Court of Canada has spoken more loudly.  
Another strong endorsement by the Supreme Court of Canada of the 
open court principle is found in its latest decision, R. v. Toronto Star 
Newspapers Ltd.
106
 The Crown argued that the Mentuck test should not 
be applied when police officers seeks to seal search warrant material, 
because the court order is being made during the course of an investiga-
tion. The Supreme Court of Canada remarked that “This argument is 
doomed to failure by more than two decades of unwavering decisions in 
this Court.”107 The Court concluded that “Public access will be barred 
only when the appropriate court, in the exercise of its discretion [on the 
basis of demonstrated and particularized grounds] concludes that disclo-
sure would subvert the ends of justice or unduly impair its proper ad-
ministration”108 
The Supreme Court of Canada has continously affirmed that the 
open court principle is the starting point. The message is clear. Closure 
is an exception that should be adopted only with relunctance. 
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IX. CONCLUSION 
The paradox is that a national security crisis, whether perceived or 
real, increases both the need for secrecy and the need for public infor-
mation. As always, it is about balance. Any responsible Canadian knows 
that governments have to protect information, but in the meantime, 
responsible officials should know that the open court principle is to be 
respected to the greatest extent possible. Information, especially about 
what courts are doing, is the key to preventing abuse in a system that 
uses a criminal law approach to combating terrorism. Information is also 
the grist for the democratic mill. While the law recognizes this, unfortu-
nately the law can go only so far in protecting the open court principle. 
Its fortunes depend largely, if not mainly, on the prevailing legal culture. 
At the end of the day, as fundamentally inconsistent as it is with our 
“culture of justification,” we are left to rely on the goodwill and good 
judgment of justice system participants.  
I have suggested that there is reason to be concerned about whether 
the prevailing legal culture is sufficiently committed to open courts. 
Parliament went deeper into the open court principle than it needed to 
when it legislated, and there are troubling signs that some justice system 
participants are so closely focused on national security that their vision 
of what it involves may be blurred, and their view of the broader needs 
of democracy obscured. This paper is an attempt to encourage those 
who administer the law to adopt the kind of deep respect for the open 
court principle that the interests of justice and democracy require. Just 
like the responsibility to protect the nation, the power to respect funda-
mental principles — and the open court principle is decidedly one — is 
held in the public trust. Those who fail to appreciate this are not Cana-
da’s protectors. They are its problem. 
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X. SCHEDULE 
NON-NATIONAL SECURITY-BASED COMPROMISES ON OPEN COURTS 
As indicated, while there are many exceptions to the open court 
principle provided for in criminal law rules unrelated to national securi-
ty, those cases tend to be defined narrowly. 
1. Closing Courts 
Courts are sometimes closed. Section 486(1) of the Criminal Code 
of Canada empowers criminal courts to exclude the public, but the pro-
vision is used extremely sparingly, primarily to encourage testimony 
from witnesses who would be disabled from testifying were the public 
to attend. Of crucial importance, the transcripts of their testimony are 
not sealed — they are subsequently made available, leaving the infor-
mation available to the public.
109
 The public is not permitted to attend 
search warrant applications either, so that the issuance of a warrant can 
be kept secret until it has been executed. After execution, however, the 
information can be accessed,
110
 absent a special sealing order. 
The public is also excluded in sexual offence cases from hearings 
into whether private records must be disclosed to the defence,
111
 or 
whether evidence about the sexual experiences of complainants can be 
led.
112
 This is not done primarily to aid the state
113
 but to protect the 
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privacy of complainants from having their personal information, unim-
portant in the case at hand, needlessly publicized. If the information is 
immaterial, it will be excluded from consideration and will not affect the 
outcome of the case. The public will therefore not lose access to juristic 
information because of the ban. If the information is material, it will 
become public after the hearing, during the trial.  
2. Closing Information to the Public 
Documents used to obtain wiretap orders are automatically sealed 
from the public,
114
 and courts have the power to seal search warrant 
materials, including DNA warrant materials, so that they remain confi-
dential after a warrant has been executed.
115
 These cases provide the 
sole exceptions in criminal cases where a trier can rely on information 
that may not be made public. This is not done for the purpose of decid-
ing issues related to the merits of a case, but for the limited purpose of 
enabling an investigative technique to be employed. In each case, there 
are procedures for setting aside the orders when the need for them ex-
pires. Those applications will tend to succeed once the relevant investi-
gation has ended, unless disclosure would reveal the identities of 
confidential informants.  
Judges will also, on occasion, inspect documents in camera in order 
to determine whether they are privileged and therefore inadmissible in 
the proceedings.
116
 Of importance, the hearings about privilege are not 
themselves closed. They are open, with the understanding that the privi-
leged information will not be revealed by those lawyers who are aware 
of it. Confidentiality is preserved in this way to keep from undermining 
the utility in granting the privilege. The information that is inspected by 
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a judge is kept from the public, unless the documents prove to be admis-
sible, in which case it becomes part of the court record.  
3. Publication Bans 
Some information is subject to temporary publication bans, but this 
is often done to secure fair trials for accused persons. Evidence or in-
formation presented during bail hearings,
117
 preliminary inquiries,
118
 and 
voir dires
119
 is temporarily suppressed to keep trial judges and juries 
from being tainted by it. Other information is subject to permanent pub-
lication ban in order to protect the privacy of individuals who come 
before the courts by preventing the public exposure of immaterial pri-
vate information; again, voir dire proceedings into disclosure of third 
party records
120
 and sexual experience evidence
121
 conducted in sexual 
offence cases is subject to publication ban, as is information that would 
disclose the identity of sexual offence complainants.
122
 In keeping with 
the philosophy of the Youth Criminal Justice Act of giving young of-
fenders a fresh start when they mature, the identity of youthful offenders 
is suppressed,
123
 and in rare cases, the identity of jurors is suppressed.
124
 
Judges also have inherent power to order publication bans, but this au-
thority is rarely used. 
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